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Abstract. We introduce a new undeniable signature scheme which is ex-
istentially unforgeable and anonymous under chosen message attacks in
the standard model. The scheme is an embedding of Boneh and Boyen’s
recent short signature scheme in a group where the decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem is assumed to be difficult. The anonymity of our scheme
relies on a decisional variant of the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption,
while its unforgeability relies on the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
1 Introduction
We design new undeniable signatures. Our approach is both practical and the-
oretical: we build a very efficient protocol with short signatures and analyze
its security in the complexity theory setting (i.e with reductionist proofs). The
security (in the sense of unforgeability and anonymity) relies on strong Diffie-
Hellman assumptions in the standard model. It is worth noting that the new
mechanism is the first efficient scheme proven secure without any random oracles.
Related work. The self-authenticating property of digital signatures can be suit-
able for many applications such as dissemination of public-key certificates or
official announcements, but seems undesirable in personally or commercially sen-
sitive applications. Therefore it may be preferable to put some restrictions on
this property to prevent misuse of signatures. Undeniable signatures were intro-
duced in 1989 by Chaum and van Antwerpen [6] to limit the self-authenticating
property of digital signatures. In this setting, one has to interact with the signer
in order to be convinced of the validity of a given signature. The security of the
seminal protocol relies on the discrete logarithm problem, but suffers from the
fact that the interactive protocols were not zero-knowledge. In 1990, Chaum [5]
improved the initial proposal by providing a zero-knowledge version. The secu-
rity of Chaum and van Antwerpen’s undeniable signatures was eventually proven
by Okamoto and Pointcheval in 2001 [20], using the so-called gap-problems. In
[21], Ogata, Kurosawa, and Heng showed that the security can in fact be proven
under a classical computational assumption. This concept has been investigated
for years, and many proposals appear in the literature. In 1991, the concept has
been refined by giving the possibility to transform an undeniable signature into a
self-authenticating signature. These convertible undeniable signatures, proposed
in [3] by Boyar, Chaum, Damg̊ard and Pedersen, provide individual and universal
conversions of the signatures. They were broken and repaired in 1996 by Michels,
Petersen and Horster [17]. Several schemes were subsequently proposed, based
on well-known signatures [10, 9, 8]. Recently, an identity-based undeniable signa-
ture scheme built on bilinear maps was proposed by Libert and Quisquater [16].
Monnerat and Vaudenay [18, 19] proposed short undeniable signatures based on
characters (without the conversion property). Finally, we extended in [15] the
concept of convertible undeniable signatures by giving the signer the ability to
convert signatures pertaining to a specific time period.
Our contributions. In groups where there exists an oracle for the decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem, Chaum and van Antwerpen’s undeniable signatures become
self-authenticating. They were revisited by Boneh, Lynn and Shacham (BLS) in
2001 [2] and considered on groups where there exists an admissible bilinear map.
An elegant variant of these signatures, still pairing-based, was introduced in 2004
by Boneh and Boyen [1] (and also by Zhang, Safavi-Naini and Susilo [23]). Its
unforgeability was proven in the standard model. Contrary to the latter ap-
proach, in this article, we remove the bilinear map from Boneh-Boyen signatures
to obtain the first efficient undeniable signature scheme without random oracle.
In [12], Goldwasser and Waisbard proposed designated confirmer signatures
without random oracles. Their techniques could be extended to construct secure
undeniable signatures. Indeed, this transformation is straightforward, since their
general construction remains secure if the designated confirmer is the signer
himself. Goldwasser and Waisbard do not give efficient disavowal protocols for
their instanciations. They argued for designated confirmer signatures there is
no need for such a protocol. However, to get an efficient complete undeniable
signature protocol, there are a number of non-trivial details that would need to
be worked out. The resulting schemes will be far less efficient than our proposal.
Our undeniable signatures are to Chaum and van Antwerpen undeniable
signatures what Boneh-Boyen’s signatures are to BLS. In the dual way, the
new scheme is to Boneh-Boyen’s scheme what Chaum and van Antwerpen’s
construction is to BLS.
The security of previous proposals of undeniable signatures is carried in the
random oracle model and therefore is only heuristic. Like Boneh-Boyen’s scheme,
the security of our protocol does not rely on any idealized primitive but needs
stronger computational assumptions. As pointed out in [14], the confirming and
denying protocols are important elements in the security analysis of an undeni-
able signature scheme. The main difficulties to study our scheme in the standard
security model, arise in the simulation of the interactive confirmation and deny-
ing protocols in the reductionist proof. The present paper provides the first
security analysis for undeniable signatures in this interactive setting.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Undeniable Signatures
Definition 1 (Undeniable Signatures). Given an integer k, an undeniable
signature scheme US with security parameter k is defined by the following:
– a common parameter generation algorithm US.Setup: it is a probabilistic
algorithm which takes as input k. The outputs are the public parameters;
– a key generation algorithm for the signers US.SKeyGen: it is a probabilistic
algorithm which takes as input the public parameters and outputs a pair of
keys (pk, sk);
– a key generation algorithm for a verifiers US.VKeyGen: it is a probabilistic
algorithm which takes as input the public parameters and outputs a pair of
keys (pk, sk);
– a key registration protocol US.Register is a protocol between a “key registra-
tion authority” (KRA) and a verifier with common input the public parame-
ters. At the end, the KRA outputs a pair (pk, notif) where pk is the verifier’s
public key and notif ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a key registration authorization decision.
– a signing algorithm US.Sign: it is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as
input a message m, a secret key sk and the public parameters. The output σ
is an undeniable signature on m;
– confirming/denying protocols US.{Confirm.Deny}: they are protocols which
take as input a message m, a putative undeniable signature σ on m, a pair
of keys (pk, sk) and the public parameters. The output is a (possibly non-
interactive) non-transferable proof that σ is actually a valid/invalid undeni-
able signature on m, with respect to the key pk;
and must satisfy the following properties (formally defined below):
1. correctness and soundness: the confirming and denying protocols and the
verifying algorithms are complete and sound, where completeness means that
valid (invalid) signatures can always be proved valid (invalid), and soundness
means that no valid (invalid) signature can be proved invalid (valid);
2. unforgeability: given a public key, it is computationally infeasible, without the
knowledge of the corresponding secret key to produce an undeniable signature
that is accepted by the verification algorithm or by the confirming protocol;
3. anonymity: given a message m and an undeniable signature σ on m, it is
computationally infeasible to find which secret key was used to generate σ;
4. non-transferability: a verifier participating in an execution of the confirm-
ing/denying protocols does not obtain information that could be used to con-
vince a third party about the validity/invalidty of a signature.
Remark 1. The aim of the protocol Register is to force the verifiers to “know”
the secret key corresponding to their public key, in order to enforce the non-
transferability property. We assume for simplicity that the verifier just reveals
his key pair (pk, sk) and the key registration authority authorizes it if and only
if (pk, sk) ∈ US.VKeyGen(params).3
3 this can always be done, since we can assume that the secret key contains the ran-
domness input used to generate it
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2.2 Security model
Anonymity. The notion of anonymity under a chosen message attack (Ano-
CMA) was precisely defined by Galbraith and Mao in [8]. An Ano-CMA-adversary
A runs in two stages. In the find stage, it takes as input two public keys pk0 and
pk1 and outputs a message m
? (and some state information s). In the guess stage
it gets a challenge undeniable signature σ? formed by signing the message m? at
random under one of the two keys, and must say which key was chosen. In both
stages, the adversary has access to the signing oracles Σ0, Σ1, to the confirming
oracles ΥC,0 and ΥC,1 (with registered verifying keys) and to the denying oracles
ΥD,0 and ΥD,1 (with registered verifying keys). The only restriction is that he
cannot query the couple (m?, σ?) on the confirming/denying oracles.
Definition 2 (Anonymity). Let US be an undeniable signature scheme and let
A be an Ano-CMA-adversary against US. We consider the following two random
experiments, for r ∈ {0, 1}, where k is a security parameter:
Experiment Expano-cma−r
US,A (k)
params
R
←− US.Setup(k)
(pk0, sk0)
R
←− US.KeyGen(params)
(pk1, sk1)
R
←− US.KeyGen(params)
(m?, s)← AΣ0,Σ1,ΥC,0,ΥC,1,ΥD,0,ΥD,1(find, params, pk0, pk1)
σ? ← US.Sign(params, m, skr)
d← AΣ0,Σ1,ΥC,0,ΥC,1,ΥD,0,ΥD,1(guess, params, pk0, pk1, m
?, σ?)
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advano−cma
US,A (k) =
∣
∣
∣
Pr
[
Expano−cma−1
US,A (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expano−cma−0
US,A (k) = 1
]∣
∣
∣
.
Given (k, τ) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the scheme US is said to be (k, τ, ε)-Ano-
CMA secure, if no Ano-CMA-adversary A running in time τ has an advantage
Advano−cma
US,A (k) ≥ ε.
Security against existential forgery under chosen message attack. Se-
curity for digital signatures was defined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [11]
as existential forgery against adaptive chosen message attacks (EF-CMA). For
undeniable signatures, unforgeability security is defined along the same lines,
with the notable difference that, while mounting a chosen-message attack, we
suppose that the adversary is allowed to query a confirming (resp. a denying)
oracle ΥC (resp. ΥD) on any couple message/signature of his choice, in addition
to the classical access to the signing oracle Σ. As usual, in the adversary answer,
there is the natural restriction that in the returned couple message/signature
(m?, σ?), the message m? has not been queried to the oracle Σ.
Definition 3 (Unforgeability). Let US be an undeniable signature scheme
and let A be an EF-CMA-adversary against US. We consider the following ran-
dom experiment, where k is a security parameter:
4
Experiment Expef−cma
US,A (k)
params
R
←− US.Setup(k)
(pk, sk)
R
←− US.KeyGen(params)
(m?, σ?)← AΣ,ΥC ,ΥD (params, pk)
Return 1 if σ? is a valid signature on m?
0 otherwise
We define the success of A via Succef-cmaUS,A (k) = Pr
[
Expef-cmaUS,A (k) = valid
]
.
Given (k, τ) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the scheme US is said to be (k, τ, ε)-
EF-CMA secure, if no EF-CMA-adversary A running in time τ has a success
Succef-cmaUS,A (k) ≥ ε.
2.3 Proof of knowledge
We cannot replace the zero-knowledge interactive proofs by non-interactive non-
transferable proofs, to obtain the security results in the standard model. As
far as we know, all these non-interactive proofs are either highly inefficient or
obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to interactive designated-verifier
proofs, and therefore their security relies on the random oracle paradigm.
Let G be a group. To confirm or deny that a bit string is a signature in the
new undeniable signature scheme, it is necessary to prove that a given quadruple
(L, M, N, O) ∈ G4 is a Diffie-Hellman quadruple (or not). To face blackmailing or
mafia attacks against our undeniable signatures, we use interactive designated
verifier proofs, as introduced in [13] by Jakobsson, Sako, and Impagliazzo, in
Chaum’s proofs of equality (cf. Fig. 1) and inequality (cf. Fig. 2) of discrete
logarithm of [5]. The idea is to replace the generic commitment scheme by a
trapdoor commitment, as defined in [4], and using classical techniques, the proofs
are readily seen to be complete, sound, and above all non-transferable. The
protocols, involve a point PV = yL where y is the secret key of the verifier,
and the prover must be convinced that PV is well-formed (in the undeniable
signature scheme, the registration protocol is used to force the users to know the
secret-key corresponding to their public key).
In both protocols, the prover is given (L, M, N, O), and he knows x = logL(M).
As argued in [5], in the proof of inequality, the prover can cheat with probability
(λ + 1)−1. This leads to the table 1 with examples for suitable λ together with
the round and computational complexities.
2.4 Underlying problems
The security of asymmetric cryptographic tools relies on assumptions about the
hardness of certain algorithmic problems. Throughout the paper G denotes an
additive group of prime order q (e.g. the group of points of an elliptic curve over
a finite field, a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field). Our scheme
relies on the difficulty of the algorithmic problems described below in G but on
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Prover Verifier
(u, v) ∈R [[1, q − 1]]
2
C
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− C = uL + vN
r ∈R [[1, q − 1]]
R1 = C + rPV
R2 = xR1
R1, R2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
u, v
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C
?
= uL + vN
r
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R1
?
= C + rPV
R2
?
= (u + yr)M + vO
Fig. 1. ZKIP protocol to prove that x = log
L
(M) = log
N
(O)
Prover Verifier
s ∈R [[0, λ]] and u ∈R [[1, q − 1]]
C, C′
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− C = uL + sN and C ′ = uM + sO
find s′ such that
(xC − C′) = s′(xN −O)
r ∈R [[1, q − 1]]
C′′ = s′L + rPV
C′′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
u
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
C
?
= uL + s′N
(s′, r)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ C ′′
?
= s′L + rPV and s
?
= s′
Fig. 2. ZKIP protocol to prove that x = log
L
(M) 6= log
N
(O)
security λ λ = 31 λ = 1023
230
#iterations
#exp.
30/ log
2
(λ + 1)
λ/2 ×#iterations
6
93
3
1534.5
280
#iterations
#exp.
80/ log
2
(λ + 1)
λ/2 ×#iterations
16
248
8
4092
Table 1. Some values of λ and computational workload in the proof of inequality
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no other special property. Therefore, we choose not to pin down a specific group
and to describe the protocol in a generic way:
Definition 4. A prime-order-group-generator (POGG) is a probabilistic algo-
rithm that takes a security parameter k as input and outputs a pair (q, G) where
q is a prime with 2k < q < 2k+1, G is a group of order q.
Let P be a generator of G. In [1], Boneh and Boyen introduced a new compu-
tational problem in a bilinear context. For our purpose, we consider this problem
in the classical discrete log setting, i.e without bilinear map.
`-Computational Strong Diffie-Hellman (`-CSDH): let x be in [[1, q− 1]].
Given an integer ` ∈ N and (P, xP, x2P, . . . , x`P ) ∈ G`+1, compute a pair
(
(x + h)−1P, h
)
in G× [[1, q − 1]] for some h ∈ [[1, q − 1]].
The invisibility of our protocol relies on the decisional variant of this problem:
`-Decisional Strong Diffie-Hellman (`-DSDH): let x be in [[1, q − 1]].
Given an integer ` ∈ N and (P, xP, x2P, . . . , x`P ) ∈ G`+1, and a pair (Q, h)
in G× [[1, q − 1]] for some h ∈ [[1, q − 1]], decide whether Q = (x + h)−1P .
In [20], Okamoto and Pointcheval proved the security of the FDH variant of
Chaum and van Antwerpen’s undeniable signatures by introducing a new class of
computational problems, called gap problems. In [21], Ogata, Kurosawa and Heng
proved that the unforgeability of the protocol is equivalent to the classical CDH
problem. In the context of undeniable signatures, the confirming and denying
protocols can be executed on any message/putative signature chosen by the
adversary. To take into account this kind of oracle access, we have to introduced
a gap-variant of the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem if we do not want to lose a
large factor in the unforgeability security reduction to CSDH.
`-Gap Strong Diffie-Hellman (`-GSDH): let x be in [[1, q − 1]]. Given an
integer ` ∈ N and (P, xP, x2P, . . . , x`P ) ∈ G`+1, compute a pair
(
(x + h)−1P, h
)
in G× [[1, q − 1]] for some h ∈ [[1, q − 1]], with the help of a `-DSDH oracle.
3 Short Undeniable Signatures Without Random Oracles
3.1 The new scheme
In this section, we describe our new undeniable signature scheme, parameterized
by a prime-order-group-generator Gen. Note, that as mentioned above, for this
basic version of the scheme, we use the direct key registration.
Common parameter generation algorithm US.Setup: on input a security
parameter k, the algorithm Gen(k) is run to produce a pair (q, G). An element
P is picked at random in G \ {0G} and the public parameters are (q, G, P ).
Key generation algorithm for the signers US.SKeyGen: Alice picks at
random her secret key (a1, a2) ∈ [[1, q − 1]]
2 and sets (P1, P2) as her public key,
with P1 = a1P and P2 = a2P .
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Key generation algorithm for the verifiers US.VKeyGen: Bob picks at
random his secret key b ∈ [[1, q − 1]] and sets PB = bP as his public key.
Signing algorithm US.Sign: to sign a message m ∈ [[1, q − 1]], Alice picks at
random r ∈ [[1, q−1]] and sets S = (a1+m+ra2)
−1P . The signature is σ = (S, r).
Confirming/Denying protocol US.{Confirm, Deny}: given a message m and
a putative signature σ = (S, r) on m, Alice proves to Bob (who has published a
registered valid public key PB) that logS(P−mS) = logP (P1+rP2) or not, using
the protocols described in section 2.3. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that
the signer do not interleave several instances asynchronously nor concurrently.
Remark 2. The notion of on-line/off-line signatures was introduced by Even,
Goldreich and Micali [7]. The idea is to generate signatures in two phases. The
first one is performed off-line (i.e. before the message to be signed is given) and
the second phase is performed on-line (once the message to be signed is known).
On-line/Off-line signatures are useful since in many applications the signer has
a very limited response time once the message is presented but he can carry out
costly computations between consecutive signing requests.
Using the sign and switch paradigm, we can convert our undeniable signature
scheme into a highly efficient on-line/off-line scheme. The signer computes off-
line S = (a1 + t)
−1P for a random t ∈ [[1, q − 1]]. Once he is given the message
m, the signature is completed with r = a−12 (t −m) where a
−1
2 mod q can also
be precomputed. The on-line signature completion procedure then amounts to
computing a hash value, a substraction and a multiplication modulo q.
Remark 3. One may require, of course, unforgeability and anonymity of the un-
deniable signatures, even against the key registration authority. To achieve this,
one can replace the direct key registration protocol by a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge of the verifier’s secret key (using for instance the Schnorr proof of
knowledge of discrete logarithms [22]). The unforgeability and the anonymity of
the scheme, can still be proved in the standard security model (by using rewind-
ing techniques). Details on the security arguments will be given in the full version
of the paper.
3.2 Security Results
Anonymity. For any Ano-CMA adversary A, we denote by BadA the event that
A queries a valid signature to the confirming/denying oracle, which has not been
obtained from the signing oracle.
Proposition 1. Let Gen be a POGG and let US be the associated undeniable
signature scheme. For any Ano-CMA adversary A against US, with security pa-
rameter k, which has advantage ε = Advano−cma
US,A (k), running time τ , making
qΣ queries to the signing oracle, qC to the confirming oracle, qD to the denying
oracle and registers up to qR keys, there exists an adversary B against (qΣ +1)-
DSDH of advantage ε′ = Adv
(qΣ+1)−dsdh
Gen,B (k) and running time τ
′, such that
ε′ ≥ ε/2− (qΣ + 2)2
−k − Pr[Bad] and τ ′ ≤ qCτ + qΣ(qΣTG + O(1)), where TG
denotes the time complexity to perform a scalar multiplication in G.
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Proof. Let k be a security parameter, (q, G) be a couple generated by Gen. We
consider a random instance of `-DSDH denoted by (P, xP, x2P, . . . , x`P, Q, h)
and we may assume that qΣ = ` + 1. We denote by Ai the point x
iP , for all
i ∈ [[0, qΣ − 1]]. We construct a simulation which solves this instance.
Game0 We consider an Ano-CMA-adversaryA with advantage Adv
ano−cma
US,A (k), within
time τ . The key generation algorithm is run twice to produces two pairs of
keys (pk0, sk0) and (pk1, sk1). In his first stage, the adversary A is fed with
pk0 and pk1, and, querying the signing oracles Σ0 and Σ1, and the con-
firming/denying oracles ΥC,0, ΥC,1, ΥD,0 and ΥD,1, outputs a message m
?.
A challenger picks b? ∈ {0, 1} at random and queries the signing oracle Σb?
on m? and sets the answer as σ?. In its second stage the attacker is given
σ? and has once more a permanent access to the oracles, with the natural
restriction not to query the challenge signature on the confirming/denying
oracles. We denote by qΣ the number of queries to the signing oracle and qC
to the confirming oracle and qD to the denying oracle.
In any game Gamei, we denote by Guessi the event b
? = b. By definition,
|2 Pr[Guess0]− 1| = Adv
ano−cma
USBM,A (k).
Game1 First, B, picks at random (α, a0, a1) ∈ [[1, q − 1]]
3, initializes a counter c to
the value 1 and two lists Σ-List = {} and Σ-List = {}. B prepares qΣ ran-
dom elements hi ∈ [[1, q − 1]], for i ∈ [[1, qΣ ]]. If h ∈ {h1, . . . , hqΣ} or (αh
mod q) ∈ {h1, . . . , hqΣ}, B aborts: this happens with probability at most
qΣ2
1−k. B computes the following polynomial:
f(y) =
qΣ
∏
i=1
(y + hi) =
qΣ
∑
i=0
αiy
i ∈ Fq [y], and the points P =
qΣ
∑
i=0
αiAi = f(x)P ,
P0 =
qΣ+1
∑
i=1
αi−1Ai = xf(x)P = xP
′ and P1 = αP0 = αxP
′. Finally B sets
params = (q, G, P ′), pk0 = (P0, a0P
′), pk1 = (P1, a1P
′) and feeds A with pk0
and pk1. The distribution of (pk0, pk1) is unchanged since (A0, . . . , A`, Q, h)
is a random instance of the `-DSDH problem and (α, a0, a1) is picked at
random. Therefore we have Pr[Guess1] = Pr[Guess0].
Game2 From this game, B performs a specific stage that allows it to retrieve each
verifier secret key y. If the direct key registration is used, then this is straight-
forward, otherwise, B might have to replay the simulation once with the same
random tape such that monitoring the re-registration of PA by A allows to
extract y. In our case, this simulation is obviously perfect, therefore we ob-
tain Pr[Guess2] = Pr[Guess1].
Game3 Now B simulates the signing oracles. It initializes a counter to c = 1, and
for each new request m ∈ {0, 1}∗, B constructs this polynomial of Fq[y]:
fc(y) =
f(y)
y + hc
=
qΣ
∏
j=1
j 6=c
(y + hj) =
qΣ−1
∑
j=0
β
(c)
j y
j and then computes
Sc =
1
αb
qΣ−1
∑
j=0
β
(c)
j Aj =
1
αb(x + hc)
P ′ where Σb, with b ∈ {0, 1} is the or-
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acle queried. Then B sets rc = (hcα
b − mc)a
−1
b . If rc = 0, then B aborts,
else it outputs (Sc, rc) as a valid signature on mc for the public key pkb
and adds (mc, (Sc, rc), b) in the Σ-List. B increments the counter. During its
whole execution, B reports failure in the signing simulation with probability
at most qΣ2
−k. This game perfectly simulates the signing oracle if it does
not abort. Therefore |Pr[Guess3]− Pr[Guess2]| ≤ qΣ2
−k.
Game4 When the adversary queries the confirming oracle ΥC,b with b ∈ {0, 1} on
a putative signature σ on m, B checks whether (m, σ, b) appears in the Σ-
List. If not, B adds this signature σ in the Σ-List and outputs Invalid.
Otherwise B computes R = P ′ −mS and Q = Pb + rabP
′ where σ = (S, r)
and simulates the proof of equality logS(R) = logP ′(Q) as follows : A sends
a commitment C to B, who picks γ ∈ [[1, q − 1]] at random and computes
R1 = γP
′ and R2 = γQ and sends (R1, R2) to A who decommits (u, v) and
B verifies that C = uP ′ + vR. If it is the case, B rewinds A, and resets the
simulation with the same random tape. He replays the same simulation up
to the moment where A sends C. B, now that he knows u, v, and y, picks
r ∈ [[1, q − 1]] at random and computes R1 = C + rPA (where PA = yP
′)
and R2 = (u + yr)Q + vS, and sends it to A, which accepts the proof.
When the adversary queries the denying oracle ΥD,b with b ∈ {0, 1} on a
putative signature σ = (S, r) on m, B verifies that σ does not appear in the
Σ-List (if it does it outputs Valid) and updates the Σ-List with σ. Then
B computes R = P ′ −mS and Q = Pb + rabP
′ and simulates the denying
protocol as follows : when A sends (C, C ′) to him, B picks randomly r̃ ∈ [[0, λ]]
and sends to A the point C ′′ = r̃P ′. A sends him back u, and B looks for
s′ ∈ [[0, λ]] such that C = uP ′+s′R. If he does not find such an s′, he aborts.
Otherwise B computes r = (r̃ − s′)y−1 so that C ′′ = s′P ′ + rPA (where
PA = yP
′). Then B sends (s′, r).
This simulation is perfect, therefore we have Pr[Guess4] = Pr[Guess3].
Game5 Now B simulates the challenge signature. The euclidean division of f(y) by
(y + h) gives
f(y)
y + h
=
γ
x + h
+
qΣ−2
∑
i=0
γiy
i. B picks at random b? ∈ {0, 1} and
the challenge signature is (S?, r?) where S? =
γ
αb?
Q +
qΣ−2
∑
i=0
γiα
b?(i−1)Ai and
r? = (hαb
?
−m?)a−1b? which is likely to be zero with probability at most 2
−k.
If this happens B aborts the simulation, otherwise he feds A with (S?, r?).
This game perfectly simulates the signing oracle unless it aborts.
This completes the description of B. If Q = Qreal = (x + h)
−1P , this game
perfectly simulates the challenge generation if the event Bad does not occur
and B does not abort (which happens with probability at most 2−k). Therefore
|Pr [Guess5|Q = Qreal]− Pr [Guess4]| ≤ 2
−k + Pr[Bad].
If Q = Qrandom is a random element from G, the adversary gains no informa-
tion on b, in an information theoretic sense, therefore:
Pr [Guess5|Q = Qrandom] ≤ 1/2 + 2
−k + 2−k.
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The last term accounts for the probability that Qrandom = Qreal. By definition,
the advantage in the Game5 simulation in solving the (qΣ + 1)-DSDH problem
is: Adv
(qΣ+1)−dsdh
Gen,Game5
(k) = |Pr [Guess5|Q = Qreal]− Pr [Guess5|Q = Qrandom]| .
A simple computation gives the claimed bounds for ε′ and τ ′. ut
Proposition 2. Let Gen be a POGG and let US be the associated undeniable
signature scheme. For any Ano-CMA adversary A against US, with security pa-
rameter k, which has advantage ε = Advano−cma
US,A (k), running time τ , making
qΣ queries to the signing oracle, qC to the confirming oracle, qD to the denying
oracle and registers up to qR keys, there exists an EF-CMA-adversary C with
success ε′′ = Succef−cma
US,A (k), running time τ
′′, making qΣ queries to the signing
oracle, qC to the confirming oracle, qD to the denying oracle and registers up to
qR keys such that ε
′′ ≥ Pr[BadA] and τ
′′ ≤ τ + O(1).
Proof. Let k be a security parameter, (q, G) be a couple generated by Gen. We
consider random public key pk and we construct a simulation which produces
an existential forgery associated to pk.
Game0 Exactly the same game as in the previous proof. By definition, we still have
|2 Pr[Guess0]− 1| = Adv
ano−cma
US,A (k).
Game1 In this game, the algorithm C simulates A’s access to the oracles this way.
It forwards pk0 = pk to A with a new public key pk1 randomly reducible to
pk (as in Game?? of the previous proof). C simulates A’s signing and con-
firming/denying protocols by using its own signing and confirming/denying
oracles for each of A’s query. During the simulation, C stored in a Σ-List
any pair message/signature accepted by the confirming oracle, not obtained
from his signing oracle.
At the end of its Find stage, A produces a message m? and sends it to its
challenger. C simulates this challenger by picking at random a bit b? and
produces either a real signature of m? thanks to its signing oracle. Let σ? be
this signature. C sends σ? to A, who begins its Guess stage. The simulation
of all oracles is the same as in the Find stage. Finally A produces a bit b?.
This game is clearly identical to the previous one. Hence, we obtain
Pr[Guess1] = Pr[Guess0].
Finally, A’s output bit is discarded by C, which outputs an element of the
Σ-List if it is not empty, and a random element of {0, 1}∗×G×[[1, q−1]] otherwise.
Its running time is the same as A’s, and its success it at least Pr[Bad]. ut
Theorem 1 (Anonymity of US). Let Gen be a POGG and let US be the asso-
ciated undeniable signature scheme. For any Ano-CMA adversary A against US,
with security parameter k, which has advantage ε = Advano−cma
US,A (k), running
time τ , making qΣ queries to the signing oracle, qC to the confirming oracle, qD
to the denying oracle and registers up to qR keys, there exist
– an adversary B against (qΣ +1)-DSDH of advantage ε
′ = Adv
(qΣ+1)−dsdh
Gen,B (k)
and running time τ ′;
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– an EF-CMA-adversary C with success ε′′ = Succef−cma
US,A (k), running time τ
′′,
making qΣ queries to the signing oracle, qC to the confirming oracle, qD to
the denying oracle and registers up to qR keys
such that ε′ + ε′′ ≥ ε/2 − (qΣ + 2)2
−k, τ ′ ≤ qCτ + qΣ(qΣTG + O(1)) and
τ ′′ ≤ τ + O(1) where TG denotes the time complexity to perform a scalar multi-
plication in G.
Proof. The result is an obvious consequence of the two previous propositions.
ut
Unforgeability.
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability of US). Let Gen be a POGG and let US be the
associated undeniable signature scheme. Let A be an EF-CMA-adversary against
US with success ε = Succef−cma
US,A (k) within time τ making qΣ queries to the
signing oracle, qC to the confirming oracles and qD to the denying oracle.
1. There exists an adversary B against (qΣ + 1)-GSDH of advantage
ε′ = Adv
(qΣ+1)−gsdh
Gen,B (k) with running time τ
′ such that:
ε′ ≤ ε/2− qΣ2
−k and τ ′ ≤ τ + (qC + qD)TDSDH + O(qΣ)
where TDSDH denotes the time complexity of the oracle DSDH.
2. There exists an adversary C against (qΣ + 1)-CSDH of advantage
ε′′ = Adv
(qΣ+1)−csdh
Gen,C (k) with running time τ
′′ such that:
ε′′ ≤ ε(2(qC + qD + 1))
−1 − qΣ2
−k and τ ′′ ≤ τ + O(qΣ).
Proof.(Sketch) We consider an EF-CMA-adversaryA with success Succef−cmaUS,A (k)
within time τ . The key generation algorithm is run to produces a pair of keys
(pk, sk). The adversary A is fed with pk, and, querying the signing oracle Σ,
and the confirming and denying oracles ΥC and ΥD , outputs a couple mes-
sage/signature (m?, σ?), where σ? was not obtained from the signing oracle.
We denote by qΣ the number of queries to the signing oracle and qC to the
confirming oracle and qD to the denying oracle.
As in Boneh and Boyen proof of security, we will construct an algorithm B
(resp. B) which is likely to break the random instance of (qΣ + 1)-GSDH (resp.
the (qΣ + 1)-CSDH): (P, xP, x
2P, . . . , xqΣ+1P ).
We distinguish two type of forgers. The simulation of any interaction with
the adversary is indistinguishable from the real attack. The only difference comes
from the possibility offered to the adversary to query a confirming/denying oracle
on any couple message/signature of his choice.
1. Thanks to the decisional oracle associated to (qΣ + 1)-SDH and the points
P, xP, x2P, . . . , xqΣ+1P , B can construct a static oracle Ox, which, given
Q and R as inputs, answers whether R = xQ. Therefore, B an perfectly
simulate an appropriate proof as in the proof of the theorem 1. The rest of
the simulation follows mutatis mutandis the one of Boneh and Boyen [1] from
which we obtain the claimed bound on ε′ and τ ′ once taken into account the
computational cost of the simulation of the confirming and denying oracles.
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2. We can suppose without loss of generality that the potential forgery out-
put by A is queried to the confirming oracle at the end of C’s execution.
We say that a couple message/signature is special if it is a valid mes-
sage/signature pair queried by A to the confirming oracle or the denying
oracle such that the signature has not been obtained from the signing oracle
(in particular (m?, σ?) is special if A succeeds). C picks at random an index
` ∈ [[1, qC + qD + 1]] as its guess of first query of a special message/signature
couple. In A’s execution, we denote by s the actual index of this first query
(and s =∞ if A does not make such a request). For the i-th query with i < `,
C chooses to confirm the signature if it has been made by the signing oracle
and to deny it otherwise. This simulation is done as in the previous proof.
If the `-th query (m`, σ`), has been obtained from the signing oracle, then C
aborts. Otherwise following mutatis mutandis Boneh and Boyen’s simulation
C tries to solve the (qΣ +1)−CSDH problem using the value σ`. C does not
abort with probability 1/(qC + qD + 1) and we get the bounds on ε
′′ and τ ′′
once taken into account the computational cost of this simulation. ut
Corollary 1 (Security of US). Let Gen be a POGG and US be the associated
undeniable signature scheme. Under the DSDH assumption in Gen, US is EF-
CMA and Ano-CMA secure against polynomial-time adversaries.
3.3 Conclusion
We designed the first efficient construction for undeniable signatures. It is a vari-
ant of Boneh-Boyen’s signature scheme in a situation where the DDH problem
is supposed to be difficult. The unforgeability and the anonymity are related
to variants of the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. The new scheme offers the
advantage of issuing short signatures. Moreover, the computational costs for the
signer in the signature generation, the confirmation/denial protocols and the
receipt generation algorithms are the lowest of all known schemes.
Zhang and Chen [24] proposed very recently a new digital signature scheme in
a bilinear setting whose resistance to forgery is reduced, in the standard security
model, to a new algorithmic problem called the k-square roots problem. This
protocol is very close to Boneh and Boyen’s scheme, the underlying non-linear
operation in [[1, q− 1]] being the square root extraction, instead of the inversion.
The computational costs of generation and verification and the size of these
signatures are identical to those of Boneh-Boyen’s signatures. By embedding
this scheme in a classical cryptographic setting we can construct, with the same
technique, a new efficient undeniable signature scheme which can be proved
unforgeable in the standard security model.
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